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Abstract
Cooperation plays a key role in the evolution of complex systems. However, the level of cooperation extensively varies with
the topology of agent networks in the widely used models of repeated games. Here we show that cooperation remains
rather stable by applying the reinforcement learning strategy adoption rule, Q-learning on a variety of random, regular,
small-word, scale-free and modular network models in repeated, multi-agent Prisoner’s Dilemma and Hawk-Dove games.
Furthermore, we found that using the above model systems other long-term learning strategy adoption rules also promote
cooperation, while introducing a low level of noise (as a model of innovation) to the strategy adoption rules makes the level
of cooperation less dependent on the actual network topology. Our results demonstrate that long-term learning and
random elements in the strategy adoption rules, when acting together, extend the range of network topologies enabling
the development of cooperation at a wider range of costs and temptations. These results suggest that a balanced duo of
learning and innovation may help to preserve cooperation during the re-organization of real-world networks, and may play
a prominent role in the evolution of self-organizing, complex systems.
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Introduction
Cooperation is necessary for the emergence of complex,
hierarchical systems [1–5]. Why is cooperation maintained, when
there is a conflict between self-interest and the common good? A
set of answers emphasized agent similarity, in terms of kin- or
group-selection and compact network communities, which is
helped by learning of successful strategies [2,3]. On the other
hand, agent diversity in terms of noise, variation of behavior and
innovation, as well as the changing environment of the agent-
community all promoted cooperation in different games and
settings [3,6–8].
Small-world, scale-free or modular network models, which all
give a chance to develop the complexity of similar, yet diverse
agent-neighborhoods, provide a good starting point for the
modeling of the complexity of cooperative behavior in real-world
networks [9–13]. However, the actual level of cooperation in
various games, such as the Prisoner’s Dilemma or Hawk-Dove
games is very sensitive to the topology of the agent network model
[14–16, Electronic supplementary material S1 – ESM1 – Table
S1.1]. In our work we applied a set of widely used network models
and examined the stability of cooperation after repeated games
using the reinforcement learning strategy adoption rule, Q-
learning. To examine the surprising stability of cooperation
observed, when using Q-learning, we approximated the complex
rules of Q-learning by designing a long-term versions of the best-
takes-over and other strategy adoption rules as well as introducing
a low level of randomness to these rules. We found that none
of these features alone results in a similar stability of cooperation
in various network models. However, when applied together, long-
term (‘learning’) and random (‘innovative’) elements of strategy
adoption rules can make cooperation relatively stable under
various conditions in a large number of network models.
Our results have a wide application in various complex systems
of biology from the cellular level to social networks and
ecosystems.
Results
Sensitivity of cooperation on network topology
As an illustrative example for the sensitivity of cooperation on
network topology, we show cooperating agents after the last round
of a ‘repeated canonical Prisoner’s Dilemma game’ (PD-game) on
two, almost identical versions of a modified Watts-Strogatz-type
small-world model network [13,17]. Comparison of the top panels
of Figure 1 shows that a minor change of network topology
(replacement of 37 links from 900 links total) completely changed
both the level and topology of cooperating agents playing with a
best-takes-over short term strategy adoption rule. We have
observed a similar topological sensitivity of cooperation in all
combinations of (a) other short-term strategy adoption rules; (b) a
large number of other network topologies; (c) other games, such as
the extended Prisoner’s Dilemma or Hawk-Dove games (ESM1
Figures S1.1 and S1.6).
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On the contrary to the general sensitivity of cooperation to the
topology of agent-networks in PD-games using the short-term
strategy adoption rule shown above, when the long-term,
reinforcement learning strategy adoption rule, Q-learning was
applied, the level and configuration of cooperating agents showed
a surprising stability (cf. the bottom panels of Figure 1). Just
oppositely to the short-term strategy adoption rule shown on the
top panels of Figure 1, the Q-learning strategy adoption rule (a) is
based on the long-term experiences of the agents from all previous
rounds allowing some agents to choose a cooperative strategy
despite of the current adverse effects, and (b) is an ‘innovative’
strategy adoption rule [3] re-introducing cooperation even under
conditions, when it has already been wiped out from the network-
community completely [18,19].
Extending the observations shown on Figure 1 we decided to
compare the level of cooperation in PD-games on small-world and
scale-free networks at various levels of temptations (T, the
defector’s payoff, when it meets a cooperator) in detail. The top
panel of Figure 2 shows that the cooperation level of agents using
the best-takes-over strategy adoption rule rapidly decreased with a
gradual increase of their temptation to defect. This was generally
true for both small-world, and scale-free networks leaving a
negligible amount of cooperation at T-values higher than 4.5.
However, at smaller temptation levels the level of cooperation
greatly differed in the two network topologies. Initially, the small-
world network was preferred, while at temptation values higher
than 3.7, agents of the scale-free network developed a larger
cooperation. The behavior of agents using the Q-learning strategy
adoption rule was remarkably different (top panel of Figure 2).
Their cooperation level remained relatively stable even at
extremely large temptation values. Moreover, the cooperation
Figure 1. A long-term learning adoption rule, Q-learning improves and stabilizes cooperation of agents forming various small-
world networks in Prisoner’s Dilemma games. The modified Watts-Strogatz small-world network was built on a 15615 lattice, where each node
was connected to its eight nearest neighbors. The rewiring probabilities of the links placed originally on a regular lattice were 0.01 (left panels) and
0.04 (right panels), respectively. For the description of the canonical repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma game, as well as the best-takes-over (top panels)
and Q-learning (bottom panels) strategy adoption rules see Methods and the ESM1. The temptation level, T was 3.6. Networks showing the last round
of 5,000 plays were visualized using the Kamada-Kawai algorithm of the Pajek program [46]. Dark blue dots and diamonds correspond to cooperators
and defectors, respectively. The Figure shows that both the extent and distribution of cooperators vary, when using the best-takes-over strategy
adoption rule (see top panels), while they are rather stable with the Q-learning strategy update rule (see bottom panels).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0001917.g001
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we compared small-world and scale-free networks. This behavior
continued at temptation values higher than 6 (data not shown). We
have observed the same differences in both the extent of
cooperation at extremely high temptations (or gains of hawks
meeting a dove in the Hawk-Dove game) and the topological
sensitivity of cooperation in all combinations of (a) other short-
term strategy adoption rules; (b) a large number of other network
topologies; (c) other games, such as the extended Prisoner’s
Dilemma or Hawk-Dove games (ESM1 Figures S1.2 and S1.6).
Long-term strategy adoption rules improve but do not
stabilize cooperation in different networks
Next we wanted to see, if other long-term strategies besides Q-
learning can also promote cooperation between agents. In Q-
learning agents consider a long-term experience learned in all the
past rounds of the play. Therefore, we modified the best-takes-over
strategy adoption rule allowing the agents to use accumulative
rewards of their neighbors in all past rounds instead of the reward
received just in the last round. In agreement with our expectations,
both on small-world and scale-free networks this long-term
strategy adoption rule outperformed its short-term version
allowing a larger number of agents to cooperate – especially at
high temptation values. Importantly, the differences between
cooperation levels observed in small-world and scale-free networks
were even greater, when we applied the long-term strategy
adoption rule compared to its short-term version (middle panel of
Figure 2). We have received very similar results in all combinations
of (a) other short- and long-term strategy adoption rule pairs; (b) a
large number of other network topologies; (c) other games, such as
the extended Prisoner’s Dilemma or Hawk-Dove games. Long-
term learning strategy adoption rules also promoted cooperation
(albeit at lower efficiency than in case of complex network
structures), when we used networks re-randomized after each play,
or randomly picked agents (ESM1 Figures S1.3–S1.6). As a
summary, we conclude that long-term strategy adoption rules
(‘learning’ instead of simple imitation) allow a larger cooperation,
but do not stabilize the cooperation-fluctuations inflicted by the
different topologies of the underlying networks, which leaves the
remarkable topological stability of the Q-learning strategy
adoption rule still unexplained.
Low level of randomness of the strategy adoption rules is
needed to stabilize cooperation level in different network
topologies
Next we tested, if the innovative elements of the Q-learning
strategy adoption rule may contribute to the stability of
cooperation in various network topologies. For this, we construct-
ed an ‘innovative’ version of the long-term version of the best-
takes-over, ‘non-innovative’ strategy adoption rule by adding a low
level of randomness instructing agents to follow the opposite of the
selected neighbor’s strategy with a pre-set Pinnovation probability (see
Methods). Cooperation levels achieved by the innovative long-
term best-takes-over strategy adoption rule are shown on the
bottom panel of Figure 2. At temptation values smaller than
T=3.8 the innovative long-term version of the best-takes over
strategy adoption rule outperformed Q-learning, which resulted in
Figure 2. Long-term learning elements of strategy update rules
help, while a low level of randomness relatively stabilizes
cooperation in Prisoner’s Dilemma games played on various
networks. Small-world (SW, filled, red symbols) networks were built as
described in the legend of Figure 1. The Barabasi-Albert-type scale-free
networks (SF, open, blue symbols) contained 2,500 nodes, where at
each construction step a new node was added with 3 new links
attached to the existing nodes. For the description of the canonical
repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma game, as well as that of the best-takes-
over (triangles, all panels), the Q-learning (rectangles, top panel) the
best-takes-over long (circles, middle panel), and the best-takes-over
long innovative (crosses, Pinnovation=0.0002, bottom panel) strategy
adoption rules, see Methods and the ESM1. For each strategy adoption
rules and T temptation values 100 random runs of 5,000 time steps
were executed. The figure shows that long-term, ‘learning-type’
elements of strategy update rules help cooperation in Prisoner’s
Dilemma games played on various networks. A low level of randomness
(also called as ‘innovation’ in this paper) brings the level of cooperation
closer in different network topologies.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0001917.g002
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panels of Figure 2). However, at high temptation values Q-
learning proved to be more efficient in maintaining cooperation.
Most importantly, cooperation levels in small-world and scale-free
networks were much closer to each other, when using the long-
term innovative strategy-adoption rule, than either the ‘only long-
term’, or short-term versions of the same strategy adoption rule
(Figure 2). At high temptation values cooperation levels of long-
term innovative strategy adoption rules on small-world and scale-
free networks were converging to each other and even to the
cooperation level observed, when using the Q-learning strategy
adoption rule. We have received very similar results in
combinations of (a) other innovative short- and long-term strategy
adoption rules; (b) a large number of other network topologies; (c)
other games, such as the extended Prisoner’s Dilemma or Hawk-
Dove games (ESM1 Figures S1.7 and S1.8). According to the
expectations [8], the stabilizing role of the randomness in the
strategy adoption rules depended on the actual value of the pre-set
Pinnovation probability, and showed an optimum at intermediary
Pinnovation levels, where the actual value of optimal Pinnovation
depended on the strategy adoption rule and network topology.
The effect of changes in Pinnovation was much more pronounced in
case of scale-free networks than at small-world networks, which is
a rather plausible outcome, since the larger irregularity of scale-
free networks makes the re-introduction of extinct strategies a lot
more crucial (ESM1 Figure S1.8).
We have shown so far that long-term, learning strategy adoption
rules help the development of cooperation, while ‘innovative’
strategy adoption rules make the cooperation level more
independent from the actual network topology. Figure 3 illustrates
how the cooperative network topologies were expanded, when we
used long-term learning and ‘innovative’ versions of the best-takes-
over strategy adoption rule as well as Q-learning at a high level of
temptation, which made cooperation especially difficult. The
application of the best-takes-over strategy adoption rule resulted in
non-zero cooperation only sporadically. Cooperation levels using
the long-term best-takes-over strategy adoption rule varied greatly,
and still had several network configurations with zero cooperation.
On the contrary, the two ‘innovative’ long-term learning strategy
adoption rules had a much higher than zero cooperation in almost
all networks tested, and the cooperation level remained fairly
stable using a great variety of network topologies. This was
especially true for Q-learning, which gave a stable level of
cooperation even at regular networks (Figure 3), which result in a
high instability of cooperation (see ESM1 Table S1.1). We have
received very similar results in extended Prisoner’s Dilemma and
Hawk-Dove games (ESM1 Figures S1.9 and S1.10).
Discussion
As a summary, our simulations showed that long-term learning
strategy adoption rules promote cooperation, while innovative
elements make the appearance of cooperation less dependent from
the actual network topology in two different games using a large
number of network topologies in model networks. We must
emphasize that the term ‘learning’ is used in our paper in the sense
of the collection and use of information enriching and diversifying
game strategy and behavior, and not in the restricted sense of
imitation, or directed information-flow from a dominant source
(the teacher) pauperizing the diversity of game strategies. The help
of learning in promoting cooperation is already implicitly involved
in the folk theorem, which opens the theoretical possibility for the
emergence of cooperation at infinitely repeated games [3,20].
Learning, communication, negotiation, reputation-building mech-
anisms have all been shown to promote cooperation in various
simulations as well as in games with groups of a variety of living
organisms, including animals and humans (ESM1 Table S1.2).
With the current work we have extended these findings showing
that agents can markedly improve their cooperation, when they
are allowed to consider long-term experiences either of their own
(Q-learning) or their neighbors (other long-term strategies used),
and this ‘shadow of the past’ [21] acts similarly at a great variety of
network topologies.
We use the term ‘innovation’ in the sense of irregularities in the
selection of adoption rules of game strategy. Therefore, ‘innova-
tion’ may be caused by errors, mutations, mistakes, noise,
randomness and temperature besides the bona fide innovation of
conscious, intelligent agents. Our term, ‘innovation’ allows the
change of the strategy adoption rules, therefore allows (increases)
the evolvability [22] of our model system. Innovative strategies
help to avoid ‘herding’, when agents start to use a uniform strategy
and behavior forming synchronous clusters (ESM1 Figures S1.11,
S1.12 and data not shown). Innovation increases game diversity
and complexity, which, similarly to the stabilizing effect of weak
links in a large variety of static networks, may significantly stabilize
network dynamics (probably by helping the convergence of
possible outcomes; [23]). Irregularities in network topology, noise,
stochastic resonance, stochastic focusing and innovative strategies
were shown to promote cooperation in various simulations as well
as in games of primates and humans (ESM1 Table S1.3).
However, the innovation-driven relative stabilization of coopera-
tion in various network topologies is a novel finding reported here.
Cooperation helps the development of complex network
structures [4,5,24]. Network dynamics and evolution lead to a
large variety of link re-arrangements [25,26]. Network evolution is
full of stochastic ‘errors’, and often results in the development of a
higher average degree [25], which makes cooperation more
difficult [15,16]. The highly similar cooperation levels of scale-free
networks with different average degrees and of many other
network topologies of model networks (Figure 3, ESM1 Figures
S1.9 and S1.10) show that innovative long-term learning strategy
adoption rules may provide a buffering safety-net to avoid the
deleterious consequences of possible overshoots and errors in
network development on cooperation. Our simulations showed
(Figure 2, ESM1 Figures S1.2 and S1.6) that the help of innovative
long-term learning is especially pronounced at conditions, where
the relative cost of cooperation is the highest making cooperation
most sensitive to the anomalies of network evolution [15]. This
extreme situation is more easily reached, when the whole system
becomes resource-poor, which makes all relative costs higher.
Resource-poor networks develop a set of topological phase
transitions in the direction of random R scale-free R star R
fully connected subgraph topologies [27]. This further substanti-
ates the importance of our findings that long-term, innovative
learning allows a larger ‘cooperation-compatible’ window of these
topologies, thus helps to avoid the decomposition of network
structure in case of decreasing system resources due to e.g. an
environmental stress. Further work is needed to show the validity
of our findings in real-world networks as well as in combination
with network evolution.
Our current work can be extended in a number of ways. The
complexity of the game-sets and network topologies offers a great
opportunity for a detailed equilibrium-analysis, similarly to that
described by Goyal and Vega-Redondo [28]. The cited study [28]
allows a choice of the interacting partners (an option denied in our
model), which leads to another rich field of possible extensions,
where the network topology is changing (evolving) during the
games such as in the paper of Holme and Ghoshal [29]. Similarly,
Learning Cooperative Networks
PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org 4 April 2008 | Volume 3 | Issue 4 | e1917Figure 3. Long-term learning and innovative elements of strategy adoption rules, when applied together allow cooperation in a
large number of model networks. (Top middle panel) The small-world (spheres) and scale-free (cones) model networks were built as described in
the legends of Figures 1 and 2. The rewiring probability, p of the links of the original regular lattices giving small-world networks was increased from
0 to 1 with 0.05 increments, the number of edges linking each new node to former nodes in scale-free networks was varied from 1 to 7, and the
means of shortest path-lengths and clustering coefficients were calculated for each network. Cubes and cylinders denote regular (p=0) and random
(p=1.0) extremes of the small-world networks, respectively. For the description of the canonical repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma game, as well as the
best-takes-over (green symbols); long-term learning best-takes-over (blue symbols); long-term learning innovative best-takes-over (magenta
symbols) and Q-learning (red symbols) strategy adoption rules used, see Methods and the ESM1. For each network 100 random runs of 5,000 time
steps were executed at a fixed T value of 3.5. (Left and right panels) 2D side views of the 3D top middle panel showing the proportion of cooperators
as the function of the mean length of shortest paths or the mean clustering coefficient, respectively. (Bottom middle panel) Color-coded illustration
of the various network topologies used on the top middle panel. Here the same simulations are shown as on the top middle panel with a different
color-code emphasizing the different network topologies. The various networks are represented by the following colors: regular networks – blue;
small-world networks – green; scale-free networks – yellow; random networks – red (from the angle of the figure the random networks are behind
some of the small-world networks and, therefore are highlighted with a red arrow to make there identification easier). The top middle panel and its
side views show that the best-takes-over strategy adoption rule (green symbols) at this high temptation level results in a zero (or close-to-zero)
cooperation. As opposed to this, the long-term best-takes-over strategy adoption rule (blue symbols) raise the level of cooperation significantly
above zero, but the individual values vary greatly at the different network topologies. When the long-term strategy adoption rule is combined with a
low level of randomness (magenta symbols) the cooperation level stays in most cases uniformly and its variation becomes high greatly diminished. Q-
learning stabilizes cooperation further even at regular networks, which otherwise give an extremely variable outcome.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0001917.g003
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avalanches like in the paper of Ebel and Bornholdt [30] as well as
exploration of a number of other topological re-arrangements
would also significantly extend the current results. Such topology-
changes may include
N hub-rewiring including the formation and resolution of ‘rich-
clubs’, where hub-hub contacts are preferentially formed
[31,32];
N emergence of modularity beyond to our data in ESM1 Figure
S1.4;
N appearance and disappearance of bridge-elements between
modules;
N changes of modular overlaps and module hierarchy, etc.
Tan [33] showed that cooperation helps faster learning. This,
when combined with our current findings may lead to a self-
amplifying cycle between cooperation and learning, where
cooperation-induced learning promotes cooperation. Emerging
cooperation alleviates a major obstacle to reach a higher level of
network hierarchy and complexity [4]. In social networks learning
establishes trust, empathy, reputation and embeddedness [34–37],
and the benefits of learning by multiple generations are
exemplified by the development of traditions, norms and laws.
These give the members of the society further reasons for
withholding their individual selfishness, thereby reaching a higher
network complexity and stability. We believe that learning and
innovation (in forms of repeated, interaction-driven, or random
network remodeling steps, respectively or using the Baldwin-effect,
see ESM1 Discussion) help the evolution of cooperation between
agents other than human beings or animals, including proteins,
cells or ecosystems [23,38], and were crucial in the development of
multi-level, self-organizing, complex systems.
Methods
Games. In both the Hawk-Dove and the Prisoner’s Dilemma
games, each agent had two choices: to cooperate or to defect. In
the repeated, multi-agent Hawk-Dove game the benefit of
defectors is higher than that of cooperators, when they are at
low abundance, but falls below cooperator benefit, when defectors
reach a critical abundance [12,13]. On the contrary, in the
Prisoner’s Dilemma game defection always has a fitness advantage
over cooperation. The canonical parameter-set of the Prisoner’s
Dilemma game (R=3,P=1,S=0, the T, temptation value varies
between 3 to 6; 3 is not included; where R is the reward for mutual
cooperation, P is the punishment for mutual defection, S and T
are the payoffs for the cooperator and defector, respectively, when
meeting each other) restricts cooperation more, than the
parameter set of the extended (also called as ‘weak’) Prisoner’s
Dilemma game (R=1,P=0,S=0 with T values ranging from 1 to
2; [11–13]). (When we tried the parameter set of R=1, P=0.2,
S=0.1 with T values ranging from 1.0 to 2.0, we have received
very similar results; data not shown.)
In the Hawk-Dove games (or in the conceptually identical
Snowdrift and Chicken games [13,39,40]) each agent had two
choices: to defect (to be a hawk) or to cooperate (to be a dove).
When a hawk met a dove, the hawk gained G benefits, whereas the
payoff for the dove was zero. Two hawks suffered a (G2C)/2 cost
each upon encounter, where C.G was the cost of their fight.
When two doves met, the benefit for each dove was G/2. If not
otherwise stated, the cost of injury (C, when a hawk met a hawk)
was set to 1. The value of G varied from 0 to 1 with the increments
of 0.1. If we want to compare the above, usually applied
nomenclature of the Hawk-Dove games with that of the Prisoner’s
Dilemma games, R=G/2, P=(G2C)/2, S=0 and T=G.
In Hawk-Dove games T.R.S.P, in the extended (also called
‘weak’) Prisoner’s Dilemma game T$R.P$S, while in the
canonical Prisoner’s Dilemma game T.R.P.S. This makes the
following order of games from less to more stringent general
conditions allowing less and less cooperation: Hawk-Dove
game.extended Prisoner’s Dilemma game.canonical Prisoner’s
Dilemma game. Due to this general order, we showed the results
of the canonical Prisoner’s Dilemma game in the main text, and
inserted the results of the two other games to the Electronic
Supplementary Material S1 (ESMS1).
Inoursimulationseachnodeinthenetworkwas anagent,and the
agent could interact only with its direct neighbors. Agents remained
at the same position throughout all rounds of the repeated games,
and they were neither exchanged, nor allowed to migrate. If not
otherwise stated, games started with an equal number of randomly
mixed defectors and cooperators (hawks and doves in the Hawk-
Dove game), and were run for 5,000 rounds (time steps). The payoff
for each agent in each round of play was the average of the payoffs it
receivedbyplaying with allitsneighbors inthecurrent round.Inour
long-term learning strategy adoption rules introduced below, the
accumulative payoff means the accumulation of the average payoffs
an agent gets in each round of play. Average payoff smoothes out
possible differences in the degrees of agents, and in several aspects
may simulate real-world situations better than non-averaged payoff,
since in real-world situations agents usually have to observe a cost of
maintaining a contact with their neighbors [39–41]. Moreover,
average payoff helps the convergence of cooperation levels as the
rounds of the game (time steps) proceed, what we indeed observed in
most of the cases (with a few exceptions noted in the text), and helps
to avoid ‘late-conversions’ occurring mostly in scale-free networks
after 10,000 or more time steps using non-averaged payoffs. With
this method it was enough to calculate the proportion of cooperators
as the average ratio of cooperators of the last 10 rounds of the game
(if not otherwise stated) for 100 independent runs.
Strategy adoption rules. In Prisoner’s Dilemma and Hawk-
Dove games our agents followed three imitation-type, short-term
strategy adoption rules, the ‘pair-wise comparison dynamics’ (also
called as ‘replicator dynamics’), ‘proportional updating’ and ‘best-
takes-over’ (also called as ‘imitation of the best’) strategy adoption
rules [13]. We call these rules strategy adoption rules and not
evolution rules to avoid the mis-interpretation of our games as
cellular automata-type games, where agents are replaced time-to-
time. In ourgames noreplacement tookplace, thereforethesegames
werenot evolutionary gamesinthis strictsense. All strategyadoption
rules had synchronous update, meaning that in each round of play
the update took place after each agent had played with all their
neighbors. To avoid the expansion of parameters with the
differential placements of various agents in complex network
structures all agents used the same strategy adoption rule in the
agent-network. In the three strategy adoption rules we applied
initially (‘best-takes-over’, ‘pair-wise comparison dynamics’ and
‘proportional updating’) all agents were myopic, and made their
decisions based on the average payoffs gained in the previous round.
Pair-wise comparison dynamics strategy adoption
rule. In the ‘pair-wise comparison dynamics’ strategy adoption
rule [13] for any agent i, a neighboring agent j was selected
randomly, and agent i used the strategy of agent j with a probability
of pi. In our experiments the probability was determined as
pi~fG i{Gj
  
~
Gj{Gi
dmax if Gj{Giw0
0 otherwise
(
,
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(for Prisoner’s Dilemma games), which was the largest gap of gain
between two agents in one round of play. Gi and Gj were the average
payoffs received by agent i and j respectively in the current round of
play.
Proportional updating strategy adoption rule. For the
‘proportional updating’ strategy adoption rule [13] agent i and all
its neighbors competed for the strategy of agent i with the
probability pi, which was determined as pi~ Gi P
n Gn ,
i,n[ Ni ðÞ |i fg where N(i) was the neighborhood of agent i and
Gi was the average payoff received by agent i in the current round
of play. Since p is a probability, C was added to each Gi to avoid
negative values. For Prisoner’s Dilemma games, because the
reward for an agent is always greater than or equal to zero, there
was no need to increase the value of Gi.
Best-takes-over strategy adoption rule. In the ‘best-takes-
over’ strategy adoption rule (also called as imitation of the best
strategy adoption rule, [13]) agent i adopted the strategy of that
agent selected from i and its neighbors, who had the highest
average payoff in the last round of play.
Q-learning strategy adoption rule. As a reinforcement
learning [19] strategy adoption rule, we used Q-learning [18],
where agents learned an optimal strategy maximizing their total
discounted expected reward in the repeated game. In Q-learning
we assumed that the environment constituted a discrete Markov
process with finite states. An agent chose action at from a finite
collection of actions at time step, t. The state of the environment
changed from state st to st+1 after the action of the agent, and the
agent received the reward rt at the same time. The probability of
state transition from st to st+1 when the agent chose action at was
prob s~stz1jst,at ½  ~Ps t,at,stz1 ½  :
The task of the agent was to learn the optimal strategy to
maximize the total discounted expected reward. The discounted
reward meant that the rewards received by the agent in the future
were worth less than that received in the current round. Under a
policy p denoting how the agent selected the action at its actual
state and reward, the value of state, st was
Vp st ðÞ ~R p st ðÞ ðÞ zc
X
stz1[S
Ps t,at,stz1 ½  Vp stz1 ðÞ ,
where R(p(st)) is the expected reward of state st under policy p and
c(0,c,1) is the discount factor.
The theory of Dynamic Programming [19] guarantees that
there is at least one optimal stationary policy, p
*, which can be
written as
V  st ðÞ ~Vp 
st ðÞ ~max
at[A
R p st ðÞ ðÞ zc
X
stz1[S
Ps t,at,stz1 ½  Vp 
stz1 ðÞ
()
:
The task of Q-learning was to learn the optimal policy, p, when
the initial conditions of both the reward function and transition
probabilities were unknown. If the environment model (reward
model and transition probabilities of states) is known, then the
above problem can be solved by using Dynamic Programming.
Watkins and Dayan [18] introduced Q-learning as incremental
Dynamic Programming. The idea of Q-learning is to optimize a
Q-function, which can be calculated iteratively without the
estimate of environment model. For this having a policy, p,w e
defined the Q-value as:
Qs ,a ðÞ ~R p s ðÞ ðÞ zc
X
s0[S
Ps ,a,s0 ½  Vp s0 ðÞ :
Q-learning consisted of a sequence of distinct stages or episodes.
The Q value of state-action pair (st, at) can be learned through the
following iterative method:
Qt st,at ðÞ ~ 1{at ðÞ Qt{1 st,at ðÞ zat rtzcVt{1 stz1 ðÞ ½  ,
where Vt{1 stz1 ðÞ ~max
a[A
Qt{1 stz1,a ðÞ fg and at controls the
learning and convergence speed of Q-learning.
In repeated multi-agent games, the state of each agent was
affected by the states of its direct neighbors. Those neighbors
constituted the environment of the agent. The reward of the agent
i after taking action at(i) was defined as:
rt i ðÞ ~
1
ki
X
j[Ni ðÞ
ST
t i ðÞ MSt j ðÞ ,
where M was the payoff matrix, St(i) was a column vector indicating
thestateofagentiatround t,kiwasthenumberofneighborsofagent
i and N(i) was the set contains all the direct neighbors of agent i.T h e
values of elements of St(i) were 0 or 1 and 1 indicated that agent i was
in the corresponding state. In such a repeated multi-agent game, Q-
learning meant that each agent tried to optimize its total discounted
expected reward in the repeated game. The optimal strategy was
approximated by an iterative annealing process. For this for each
agent, the selection probability (Boltzmann-probability) of action ai
at time step t was defined as
prob ai ðÞ ~
eQs t,ai ðÞ =T
P
ak[A
eQs t,ak ðÞ =T ,
where T was the annealing temperature. In our experiments we
selected the discount factor, ct=0.5, since in the initial experiments
we found that this value is helpful to achieve high levels of
cooperation. The initial annealing temperature was set to 100 in
Hawk-Dove and extended Prisoner’s Dilemma games, while it was
raised to 10,000 in canonical Prisoner’s Dilemma games to extend
the annealing process [42]. In all cases the annealing temperature
was decreased gradually by being divided by t in each round of the
game till it reached a low bound of 0.001. In order to control the
convergence speed of Q-learning, a=1/(1+TimesVisited(s, a)) where
TimesVisited(s, a) was the number of times that the state-action pair (s,
a) had been visited at time step t.I nt h i sw a ya decreased gradually
with the time.
Long-term learning and innovative strategy adoption
rules. Long-term learning strategy adoption rules were
generated by considering the accumulative average payoffs
instead of instantaneous average rewards in the update progress
during each round of play for all strategy adoption rules used. In
both short term and long-term innovative strategy adoption rules,
agent i used the opposite strategy of the selected neighbor (for
proportional updating and best-takes-over strategy adoption rules,
the neighborhood included agent i itself) in the last round of play
with probability of Pinnovation, which was 0.0001 in case of Hawk-
Dove and extended Prisoner’s Dilemma games, while 0.0002 in
case of canonical Prisoner’s Dilemma games, if not otherwise
stated (like in the legend of ESM1 Figure S1.8). In innovative
Learning Cooperative Networks
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neighbor with a probability of 12Pinnovation.
Network construction. In our work we used a set of widely
adopted model networks to simulate the complexity of real-world
situations. Generation of the Watts-Strogatz-type small-world
model network [17] was modified according to Tomassini et al.
[13] to avoid the heterogeneity in node degrees, which arose
during the Watts-Strogatz-type rewiring process changing the
regular lattice to a small-world network. Such heterogeneity was
shown to have a rather big influence on the level of cooperation
[13,43]. At the generation of the Barabasi-Albert-type scale-free
network [44], we started from an initial fully connected graph of
‘m’ nodes (where ‘m’ ranged from 1 to 7), and added the new
nodes with ‘m’ novel links as specified at the individual Figure
legends. In the modular networks described by Girvan and
Newman [45] each network had a scale-free degree distribution,
contained 128 nodes, and was divided into 4 communities. The
average degree was 16. Modularity (community structure) was
gradually decreased at ‘levels’ 1, 5, 10 and 16, where ‘level 1’
meant that for each node in the network, the expected number of
links between a node and the nodes which were in other
communities was 1 (e.g. low compared to the average degree of
16). With increasing ‘level’ the community structure gradually
decreased.
Network visualization. At the visualization the coordinates
of the small-world networks with a rewiring probability of p=0.01
were used for the p=0.04 networks to avoid the individual
variations of the Pajek-figures [46] and to help direct comparison.
With 15615 agents the final representations of cooperators
showed a moderate variability. This was almost negligible, when
50650 agents were used (data not shown). However, 15615
agents gave a better visual image than the crowded, bulky 50650
version. Therefore, we opted to include this variant to Figure 1.
We have selected those figures from the results of 15615 agent
games, which best represented the 50650 versions.
Supporting Information
Electronic Supplementary Material S1 This supporting
information extends the major findings of the paper to two
different games (the extended Prisoner’s Dilemma Game and the
Hawk-Dove/Snowdrift game) and a wide parameter set, and gives
additional methods, discussion and references.
Found at: doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0001917.s001 (0.74 MB
PDF)
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